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Dismissal of Police Officers for Exercising Privilege
Against Self Incrimination.
The Civil Service Commission of the City of Chicago recently dis-
charged two police officers' for invoking their constitutional privilege
of immunity from self incrimination
2 by refusing to sign an immunity
waiver3 when called upon to testify before a grand jury. Subsequently
the Superior Court of Cook County quashed the record returned by
the commission,
4 and the two cases are now pending on appeal before
the Illinois Appellate Court.
The two officers, previously assigned to investigate the killing of one
James Ragen, were suspected with three private citizens of having con-
spired to obtain an unfounded indictment for that murder.
5 When
'In the Matter of Thomas E. Connelly, Captain, Department of Police of the
City of Chicago, Respondent, Case No. H 4789 (October 16, 1947); In the Matter
of William J. Drury, Lieutenant, Department of Police of the City of Chicago,
Respondent, Case No. H 4790 (October 16, 1947).
2111. Const. Art. II, §10: "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to
give evidence against himself, . . . " Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 38, §734: " ... a
defendant in any criminal case or proceeding shall only at his own request be deemed
a competent witness, ... I I
3 In Cook County, Illinois, the state's attorney's office frequently asks a possible
defendant to sign the following standard waiver before he is taken before the
grand jury to testify:
Chicago, Illinois .................
I, .................................... have been advised of my legal
rights. I now know I cannot be compelled or forced to give testimony
against myself before the Grand Jury or any Court. I now know I do not
have to make any statement nor give any answer to any question that may
tend to incriminate me. I know now that whatever I say here can be used
against me in any criminal proceeding involving the subject matter of my
testimony.
No one has forced me, by threats or otherwise, or promised me anything,
either directly or indirectly to appear and testify before the Grand Jury.
Of my own free will and with full knowledge of my rights in this matter
I am willing to testify before the Grand Jury and I hereby waive all claim
of immunity that I may have by reason of my appearing and giving testi-
mony before the grand jury concerning certain matters of which I have
knowledge.
Witness to Signature:
'Drry v. Hurley, et al., case No. 47-S17720 (1948); Connelly v. Hurley, et al.,
case No. 47-S-17721 (1948). Both eases were decided by Judge Sbarbaro.
5 Three witnesses testified before the grand jury on March 17, 1947 that they
could identify persons in the truck from which Ragen was shot. At least partly on
the strength of their testimony, three men were indicted for that killing. Sometime
between March 17th and April 2nd, two of the three witnessea recanted their prior
testimony. The three witnesses and the two officers were then suspected of con-
spiring to obtain the indictment.
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called before the grand jury to testify about the alleged conspiracy, the
two officers refused to sign an immunity waiver and were excused with-
out questioning.
While expressly recognizing that the officers possessed the constitu-
tional privilege to refuse to testify and that they had exercised the
privilege in good faith, the Civil Service Commission of the City of Chi-
cago held that refusal to sign the waiver was in effect a refusal to testify
unless immunity be granted them and was, therefore, conduct unbecom-
ing a police officer and cause for dismissal. The Superior Court of Cook
County then entertained a motion to quash the record of the commis-
sion and issued a writ of certiorari. In an unpublished opinion, the
court sustained the officers' motion on the grounds (.1) that, while they
did refuse to sign an immunity waiver when called before the grand
jury, they at no time refused to testify; and (2) that as a matter of
law, the refusal of the plaintiffs to waive their constitutional privilege
in advance of testifying does not constitute cause for removal.
The Illinois statute regulating discharge of municipal civil service
employees 6 provides that an employee may not be removed "except for
cause, upon written charges and after an opportunity to be heard in
his own defense." While no provision is made for review, and the statu-
tory language might seem to indicate that none was intended,7 the Illi-
nois courts have held that common law certiorari is proper.8 It seems
that the courts formerly confined their review on certiorari to two ques-
tions: Did the administrative agency have jurisdiction, and did it com-
ply with the procedure prescribed by the statute ?9 In recent years this
review has apparently grown to include a finding of whether there is
evidence fairly tending to support the conclusion of the agency.10 How-
ever, the principal case involves no disputed issue of facts and no ob-
jections to the procedure followed by the commission, and the Superior
Court found that the officers received a fair and impartial hearing. It
I Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 241, §51.
'Ibid. "The finding and decision of such commission or investigating officer or
board, when approved by said commission, shall be certified to the appointing
officer, and shall be forthwith enforced by such officer." (Italics supplied.)
$Kamman v. City of Chicago, 222 Il1. 63, 78 N.E. 16 (1906); People ex rel
Fosse v. Allman, 329 Il1. App. 296, 68. N.E. (2d) 203 (1946).
'A return to a writ of certiorari would not bring up the evidence nor would an
error of judgment be inquired into or corrected; only jurisdiction and whether the
commission proceeded legally were subject to review. Doolittle v. Galena and Chicago
Union R. Co., 14 Ill. 381 (1853); Chicago and Rock Island R. Co. v. Fell, 22 Ill. 333
(1859); Donahue v. County of Will, 100 Ill. 94 (1881); Joyce v. City of Chicago,
216 111. 466, 75 N.E. 184 (1905); Kamman v. City of Chicago, 222 Ill. 63, 78 N.E.
16 (1906); Peoply v. Lindblom, 182 Ill. 241, 55 N.E. 358 (1899) (court cannot
review errors of law or errors of application of law to facts on writ of certiorari).
Removal of federal civil service employees by appointing officer is not subject
to judicial review providing the removal was in compliance with the procedure pre-
scribed by statute. Eberlein v. U.S., 257 U.S. 82 (1921) (charges subsequently
found to be unfounded, but finding by executive officer of "cause" for removal
not subject to revision by the courts) ; Levine v. Parley, 107 F. (2d) 186 (Dist. Ct.
D. C. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 622; Asher v. Forrestal, 71 F. Supp. 47), (Dist.
Ct. D. C. 1947).
"Funkhouser v. Coffin, 301 ll. 257, 133 N.E. 649 (1921); Carroll v. Houston,
341 Il1. 531, 173 N.E. 657 (1930). But cf. Hine v. Roberts, 309 Ill. 439, 141 N.E.
166 (1923); Hopkins v. Ames, 344 Ill. 527, 176 N.E. 729 (1931). For a more ex-
tended discussion of the trend toward a broader scope of review on certiorari, see
Note (1946) 14 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 270.
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appears that the Superior Court judge recognized refusal to testify
under the circumstances as "cause" for dismissal, but, contrary to the
Commission's decision, held that the refuual to sign the waiver did not
constitute such "cause."
Since the statute does not define "cause," the leg-islature, as appar-
ently recognized by the courts, left its definition and application to the
discretion of the commission. 1' The principal case would, therefore, ap-
pear to present the question of whether the courts should review the
commission's finding that refusal to sign a waiver was "cause" for dis-
missal, and if so, what test should be used on review. Since the civil
service commission was established to administer the city's personnel
affairs and is charged with the duty to hold hearings to determine
whether there is adequate cause for removal, it would seem that the
courts should not reverse the commission's finding of "cause" unless
the finding is so unrelated to the requirements of the service that it is
unreasonable and, therefore, arbitrary.1 2  While some may take issue
with the commission, its decision is not so unreasonable that it should
be reversed by the courts.
On the merits, this case lends itself to simple analysis. On the one
hand is the position taken by the civil service commission.13 It held that
the two policemen, though possessing the privilege guaranteed by the
constitution, had an overshadowing duty to give their testimony. It
was their privilege to remain silent, but having done so they had
breached their duties as policemen. This breach of duty, the commission
concluded, warrants dismissal. An opposing theory, starting with the
truism that to condition the privilege with punishment is to restrict it,
reasons that in effect these two officers were deprived of the immunity
from self incrimination guaranteed them by the constitution. While the
Superior Court apparently did not reject the commission's theory, it
" Joyce v. City of Chicago, 216 Ill. 466, 75 N.E. 184 (1905); Kamman v. The
City of Chicago, 222 Ill. 63, 78 N.E. 16 (1906). See Hopkins v. Ames, 344 Ill. 527,
532, 176 N.E. 729, 731 (1931).
In two cases, the Illinois Appellate Court apparently acknowledged the rule that
definition of "cause" lies within the commission's discretion, but circumvented it
by considering the "cause" found by the commission only as evidence indicating
misconduct. Thus, although the facts were not in issue, the court enabled itself to
review the finding of the commission without expressly reversing a findiag of
"cause." Campbell v. Civil Service Commission of Springfield, 290 Ill. App. 105, 8
N.E. (2d) 49 (1937); Cartan v. Gregory, 329 Ill. App. 307, 68 N.E. (2d) 193 (1946).
"See Murphy v. Houston, 250 Ill. App. 385, 394 (1928).
"In the Matter of Thomas E. Connelly, Respondent, case No. H 4789 (October
16, 1947), cited supra note 1:
"If the respondent had resigned in advance it would have been proper for him
to refuse as he did to waive immunity from criminal prosecution. A police officer
always has that choice. He may forego his constitutional privilege and keep his job,
or he may resign, and, being thus relieved of his duty to the public as a police
officer, he may exercise his constitutional privilege. He may not do both.
"Police officers charged with the investigation of crime and employed, paid and
relied upon by the public to aid both in its detection and proof, should not, in
criminal cases, hide behind the cloak of cobstitutional privilege either by refusing
to testify or by claiming in advance immunity from prosecution as to matters as to
which they are called to testify, through their refusal to sign immunity waivers be-
fore so testifying.
"Police officers should at all times so conduct themselves that they may have no
hesitancy in appearing before a grand jury in any criminal case without claiming
immunity from criminal prosecution."
19481
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drew a distinction between refusing to testify and refusing to sign an
immunity waiver and reversed the commission's decision on that ground.
There is nothing startling in the conception that a public servant's
right to retain his employment should depend upon his willingness to
forego his constitutional rights to the extent that the exercise of such
rights may be inconsistent with the performance of his duties.14 Thus,
in McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford,15 the removal of a police officer
was affirmed although the petitioner argued that his discharge from the
force for actively engaging in politics invaded his right to express his
political opinions. The late Justice Holmes, writing for the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, said: "The petitioner may have a con-
stitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be
a policeman. "16
The few cases in point' 7 seem to take the position that police officers
are necessary exceptions to the rule that the privilege is positive and
unequivocal, subject to no condition. According to these cases, police
officers are employed to detect crime, to prevent it where possible, and
to bring criminals to punishment. They hold that to preserve one's privi-
lege of being a policeman-an agent of the city-one must express his
willingness to expose all crimes within his knowledge, or his "agency"
will be terminated. To take the example used by the California District
Court of Appeal in Christal v. Police Commission of San Francisco :'s
"1 Executive Order 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1947) (President's Loyalty Order);
McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892) (police
officer discharged for taking active part in politics) ; Perez v. Board of Police Com-
missioner of Los Angeles, 68 Cal. App. (2d) 638, 178 P. (2d) 537 (1947) (police
officers restricted from joining labor unions). But cf. Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F. (2d)
136 (C.C.A. 2d, 1947), cert. denied, 16 Law Week 3162 (1947) (school teacher
served on federal g-and jury instead of claiming exemption; discharge for absen-
teeism held infringement of Civil .Rights Act); Note (1948) 43 Ill. L. Rev.
Note (1947) 47 Col. L. Rev. 1082; Note (1947) 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1346.
15 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
" Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
Christal v. Police Commission of San Francisco, 33 Cal. App. (2d) 564, 92 P.
(2d) 416 (1939) (police officer refused to testify before grand jury). Accord, Souder
v. City of Philadelphia, 305 Pa. 1, 156 At.. 245, 77 A.L.R. 610 (1931). Souder's
personal income far exceeded his yearly salary as a police captain. When testifying
before the grand jury and before the commission, he failed to give an explanation
that in any degree removed the suspicion that was upon him. The court held that
not only was it his duty to protect the citizens of the municipality, but also, especially
in light of his high position on the force, to hold himself above suspicion; his
failure to account for the source of his income was in itself conduct unbecoming an
officer.
8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §2251. In discussing the significance of
tl'e privilege, Wigmore points out that it originated as a restriction on the in-
quisitorial powers of the, ecclesiastical courts, and that its restriction of inquisi-
tions and stimulation of the prosecution to a full and fair search for evidence pro-
curable by their own exertions are its principal justifications in our legal system.
Cautioning that the privilege works more directly to protect the guilty than it does
to protect the innocent, he warns that in preserving the privilege, one must not give
it more than its due significance. Wigmore, in referring to the specific problem of
the principal case, quotes dicta by Judge Lassing in Scholl v. Bell, 125 Ky. 750,
102 S.W. 248 (1907), as the correct moral attitude toward the privilege. Judge
Lassing, referring to police who refused to testify in reference to an election
fraud, pointed out that the privilege is a rule of necessity beyond which it should
not be extended and that its use should not be considered as affording the witness
a certificate of good character.
23 33 Cal. App. (2d) 564, 92 P. (2d) 416 (1939), cited supra note 17.
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One of the most cherished rights guaranteed by our constitution is the
right to freedom of speech. A police officer, relying upon his right of
freedom of speech, might warn the proprietors of an illegal establish-
ment of an impending police raid, but such conduct would clearly con-
stitute cause for dismissal. A claim that such dismissal violated the of-
ficer's right to freedom of speech is obviously untenable. From this it
would seem that when the police officers in the principal case refused to
expose all they knew regarding criminal activities, they failel to per-
form the very function for which they were commissioned.
In re Holland" apparently is the only Illinois case dealing with a
similar problem. The respondent, at the time a judge of the Municipal
Court of the City of Chicago, exercised his privilege from self incrimi-
nation and refused to sign an immunity waiver when called before the
grand jury. The Chicago Bar Association commenced disbarment pro-
ceedings. In distinguishing the cases cited above involving policemen,
the Illinois Supreme Court emphasized that the respondent could be
tried only as a lawyer, and that while a lawyer is generally obligated to
assist in the investigation of crime, he is not specifically charged as is a
policeman. The court concluded that "unless the circumstances sur-
rounding him or duties placed upon him are of such character as to re-
quire, in honesty and good conscience, that he waive the right," a person
is not guilty of wrong should he claim it.20 It is the contention of the
civil service commission in the principal case that the duties of police
officers clearly place them within the exception for which the Illinois
Supreme Court provided.
2 1
The Superior Court did not take issue with the holding in the cases
cited by the commission. Instead, after emphasizing that the officers
"at no time refused to testify before the grand jury," and that they
testified before the commission concerning the conspiracy charge,22 the
court carefully attempted to distinguish the cases on the grounds that
the two officers only refused to sign an immunity waiver. The court's
opinion raises two questions with which it did not specifically deal:
10 377 fI1. 346, 36 N.E. (2d) 543 (1941).
31 Id. at 357, 36 N.E. (2d) at 548.
Conceding that the respondent could not be tried as a judge but only in his
capacity as a lawyer, it could be argued that his position on the bench imposed
upon him, as a lawyer, a stricter code of duty which would require him to -waive
his immunity. Surely we can expect as high a standard of conduct from our
judges as we do from the policeman on the street corners. Are the distinctions in
In re Holland valid!
2In re Grae, 282 N.Y. 428, 26 N.E. (2d) 963 (1940) holds that the exercise of
the privilege by a lawyer is not grounds for disciplinary action. While Canteline v.
McClellen, 282 N.Y. 166, 25 N.E. (2d) 972 (1940) was decided on Art. I, section
6, of the New York constitution (as amended in 1939), it cites with approval
Christal v. Police Commission of San Francisco, 33 Cal. App. (2d) 564, 92 P. (2d)
416 (1939), cited supra note 17. Do these two New York cases indicate a distinction
in that state between cases involving lawyers and cases involving policemen?
"The commission found that although the officers testified before the grand
jury at an earlier investigation of the Ragen killing, they refused to testify before
that body when it was investigating the alleged conspiracy, and that the officers
breached their duty at that time. It has been held that a change of mind after
discharge proceedings have commenced does not purge a policeman of his errors.
Roche v. Police Commission of San Francisco, 33 Cal. App. (2d) 574, 92 P. (2d)
422 (1939) (police officer expressed desire to testify before grand jury after




(1) Did the officers actually refuse to testify when they refused to sign
the immunity waiver? (2) If the answer is no, is there a valid distinc-
tion between refusal to testify and refusal to sign a waiver under the
circumstances in the principal case?
(1) Could the police officers have quashed a resulting indictment if
the state's attorney's office had gone one step farther and questioned
the officers before the grand jury without the benefit of a signed waiver?
If the answer to this question is yes, it is obvious that the police officers
stood on their immunity from self incrimination and refused to make
their testimony available to the state's attorney. It is generally conceded
that the privilege from self incrimination applies to grand jury pro-
ceedings. 23 It is uswally stated that the privilege is not a prohibition of
inquiry and that it only gives a witness an option to refuse to answer
when the answer would tend to incriminate him. This option is personal
and must be claimed by the person entitled to the protection from self
incrimination. If a witness answers a question, he is considered to have
waived his privilege.24 However, many jurisdictions have made a dis-
tinction between general witnesses and persons against whom an investi-
gation is actually directed. One group of jurisdictions follows the rule
that if the person testifying is a mere witness, he must claim his privi-
lege as to individual questions, whereas, if he is in fact the party pro-
ceeded against (even though the investigation be ostensibly general), he
cannot be called before the grand jury and questioned. If he answers
the questions put to him before the grand jury, any resulting indict-
ment is invalid even though he claimed no privilege.25 This rule applies
even though the accused was aware of his privilege26 and even though
the accused's testimony was not the only evidence to support the indict-
ment.27 The opposing group of jurisdictions does not make this distinc-
tion, but treats the person against whom the investigation is directed in
the same manner as any witness and considers him to have waived the
immunity if he answers an incriminating question, whether or not he
was aware of his privilege.28
In Boone v. People29 the Illinois Supreme Court declared that the
grand jury constitutes a part of the court, and that witnesses sworn
before that body are sworn in open court, although not necessarily in
the presence of the judge. The defendant in that case was taken from
jail and examined as a witness before the grand jury. Refusing to con-
sider whether the defendant's testimony influenced the grand jury's
finding, the court held the questioning before the grand jury grounds to
quash the indictment. In arriving at its conclusion, the court laid great
n Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); People v. Spain, 307 Inl. 382,
138 N.E. 614 (1923); and 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §2252.
24 8 Wigmore, op cit. supra note 23, §2268.
25 State v. Froiseth, 16 Minn. 296 (Gil 260) (1870); People v. Bermel. 71 Misc.
356, 128 N.Y.S. 524 (1911) ; State v. Smith, 56 S.D. 233, 228 N.W. 240 (1920).
State v. Naughton, 221 Mo. 398, 120 S.W. 53 (1909) ; People v. Singer, 18 Abb.
N.C. 96 (N.Y. 1886); People v. Seaman, 174 Misc. 729, 22 N.Y.S. (2d) 917 (1940)
(defendant exercised privilege in response to one question).
"Boone v. People, 148 I1. 440, 36 N.E. 99 (1894); State v. Gardiner, 88 Minn.
120, 92 N.W. 529 (1902).
2 Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303 (1912) ; People v. Lauder, 82 Mich. 109,
46 N.W. 956 (1890) ; Burke v. State, 104 Ohio St. 220, 135 N.E. 644 (1922).
148 ill. 440, 36 N.E. 99 (1894), cited supra note 27.
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emphasis on the statutory provision 0 that a defendant in any criminal
case or proceeding shall only at his own request be deemed a competent
witness. Boone v. People would seem to indicate that the Illinois courts
would quash all resulting indictments if the person proceeded against
answered questions before a grand jury.31 Xt least it should just iy thc
practice of the Cook County state's attorney's office of not taking a
par'ty proceeded against before the grand jury unless he signs an im-
munity waiver. In light of the ruling in the Boone case, refusal to ex-
press willingness to testify before the grand jury by signing a waiver
is probably, for all practical purposes, refusal to testify before that body.
(2) But even if one assumes that the Illinois courts would treat the
person against whom the investigation is directed in the same manner
as any witness called to testify before the grand jury, is there a valid
distinction between refusal to testify and refusal to sign an immunity
waiver? This distinction drawn by the Superior Court leaves one faced
with the rule that a police officer will not be discharged for refusing
to sign an immunity waiver before he is taken before the grand jury,
but if he invokes his constitutional immunity in response to any ques-
tion asked him before that body, he is subject to dismissal. This distinc-
tion between refusing to testify and refusing to sign an immunity waiver
before appearing before the grand jury is unimpressive. Refusal to sign
an immunity waiver can mean only one thing-the person refusing to
sign is unwilling to expose all he knows about certain alleged criminal
activities because the exposure will tend to incriminate him. That is the
only grounds upon which this constitutional privilege can be invoked.
Refusal to sign the waiver would seem to be just as much a breach of
-duty as an actual refusal to testify.
DALE ELLsWORTH SHERROW
3ll. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 38, §734.
The defendant, Boone, was taken from jail before the grand jury. It does not
appear that he was advised of his constitutional rights, and the court also found
an insufficiency of evidence. These are factual distinctions from the principal case.
However, considering the express wording of the statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 38,
§734,.cited .vupra note 2) and the court's ruling that a witness before the grand
jury is a witness in olen court, all indications are that Illinois courts would make
no distinction in the cases where the defendant was aware of his rights. Note, how-
ever, that, in spite of similar circumstances, the federal courts have not arrived at
this rule. In Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) the court ruled that
a grand jury hearing was a "criminal case" within the meaning of the constitu-
tion. The Counselman case and 20 Stat. 30 (1878), 28 U.S.C., §632 (1928) (a de-
fendant is a competent witness "at his own request, but not otherwise") were on
the records when the Supreme Court decided Powers v. U.S., 233 U.S. 303 (1912)
cited supra note 28.
1948]
